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OF GARDENS AND STREETS: A 
DIFFERENTIATED MODEL OF PROPERTY 
IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
SPACE LAW 
KaliN. Murray' 
INTRODUCTION 
Often, when I visit cities, I go to gardens. A visit to a gar-
den works on many levels. You can walk on the trails and paths 
that the landscape architect has deftly laid out. As you walk, 
you can admire the beauty of the various things that make up 
gardens such as the flowers, the trees, the vines, and other 
flora. And once you leave the garden, you can recall its beauty 
with pictures of the garden or a diary account of the particular 
property. A key aspect, then, of the "garden" is your ability to 
experience the pleasure of walking along the path, the pleasure 
of viewing flowers, and the pleasure of recalling both of these 
experiences. Your supposedly singular experience, then, is 
really one of many discrete and overlapping experiences. While 
you, a casual visitor, may be content to simply "visit" the gar-
den, within a legal context, this choice may flatten important 
distinctions between categories. Indeed, an important task of a 
legal regime is the ability to differentiate between these diverse 
"things" which may underlie a singular subject. 
I begin with gardens, not space, the subject of this confer-
ence for two reasons. Initially, the metaphor of a garden serves 
to "normalize" the treatment of space within the law. Often, 
analyses of space law treat this subject as a separate area, in-
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dependent of standard debates in other disciplines such as 
property and intellectual property. For example, the recent in-
novative scholarship as to "the commons" that has taken place 
in both intellectual property and property discussions is largely 
absent from the treatment of property in national and interna-
tional space law. I think of this conference and resulting Essay 
as the opportunity to begin a fruitful dialogue between space 
law and a number of the more traditional disciplines. 
The metaphor of the garden serves another narrower pur-
pose. The garden reflects the way in which property law creates 
a differentiated legal framework, which I argue below, would be 
useful in describing how property should be treated within the 
space law regime. The metaphor of a garden very nicely reflects 
the different categories used to describe those "objects" in which 
claims of property ownership are made. The garden I have de-
scribed roughly corresponds to the categories we assign to regu-
lated "things" in property. The garden itself is land or real 
property;! the items contained in the garden such as flowers and 
trees are chattels;' and the subsequent accounts could be copy-
righted and are thus, fall within the category of intangible or 
intellectual property.' This differing treatment is furthered by 
the process of dividing the rights of users into a separate series 
of categories, such as the right to exclude, the right to use and 
the right to transfer.4 This so-called "bundle of rights" can have 
1 Real property is commonly defined as land and generally whatever is erected or 
growing upon or affixed to the land. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (6th ed. 1990); see 
also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 105·111 (1997) (reviewing the distinc· 
tions between the types of different objects of property). 
2 A chattel is commonly defined as an article of personal property that is personal 
and movable in nature. Two types of categories of chattel exist: (1) personal chattel, 
which have no connection with real estate; and (2) real chattels, which are those inter-
ests annexed to the real estate. BLACK'S, supra note lat 236. Arguably, some ambiguity 
exists as to whether the flowers, flora, other trees, would be classified as things annexed 
to real property or to real chattel. For purposes of this discussion, I refer to these things 
as real chattel. 
3 Intangible property is commonly defined as property that is a "right" such as 
patent, copyright, trademark or one that is lacking a tangible existence. Id. at 809. 
4 While I will not discuss extensively in this paper, another way to differentiate the 
treatment property is to distinguish between private and public spaces. The space itself 
can be further divided by the "public" or "private" qualities of a thing. A space or thing 
that is somehow is subject to multiple users can be defined as a "public"; a space or thing 
that is available only to a singular owner or that whose use is controlled by that owner 
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varying amounts of strength when applied to any particular ob-
ject as Justice Stanley Mosk, in dissent, noted in Moore v. Uni-
versity of California Regents': 
But the same bundle of rights does not attach to all forms of 
property. For a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or 
even forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of 
property. For example, both law and contract may limit the 
right of an owner of real property to use his parcel as he sees 
fit. Owners of various forms of personal property may likewise 
be subject to restrictions on the time, place, and manner of 
their use. Limitations on the disposition of real property, 
while less common, may also be imposed. Finally, some types 
of personal property may be sold but not given away, while 
others may be given away but not sold and still others may 
neither be given away nor sold.6 
What characterizes these property rights, then, is the ability to 
have mutable, differential relationships, depending on both the 
characteristics of the property itself as well as the right at 
stake. 
is defined as "private". Of course, such boundaries are complicated all the time. A "pri~ 
vate" space may accommodate public purposes; a "public" space may yield to private 
uses. Here, I return to gardens, and one set of gardens, in particular, the formal gar-
dens of Versailles. The formal gardens of Versailles demonstrate these potential duali-
ties. While the formal gardens of Versailles were nominally constructed as a "private" 
space for the King Louis XN, he often designed elaborate garden tours for tourists and 
visiting dignitaries that reinforced and re-iterated his "public" power as the King. So, 
the "private" roles of Versailles became intrinsically linked to "public" roles, thus dem~ 
onstrating the potential ambiguities in how we conceive of and subsequently attach 
rights to, different types of spaces. Chandra Mukerji states that: 
The importance of the gardens to Louis XIV's reign was underscored by the 
itineraries written to direct visits to the gardens of Versailles. Some of the few 
pieces written in Louis XIV's own hand were itineraries for promenades that 
he penned for his own use on diplomatic occasions; the king wrote these guides 
himself apparently because he placed great weight on the ritual tours of the 
park. The promenades were formal affairs, at which distinguished visitors 
were feted and entertained as they followed the prescribed paths through gar-
dens. What they did and saw in these circuits was somehow meant to inform 
their assessments of the king and his court. 
Id. CHANDRA MUKERJI, TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND THE GARDEN OF VERSAILLES 9 
(1997). 
~ Moore v. University of California Regents, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 166-65 (1990). 
" ld. at 166. 
364 JOURNAL OF SPACE LA W [VOL. 32 
This Essay is divided into two sections. As I view this as an 
exercise in normalizing "space", Section I explores how the dif-
ferent treaties that comprise the international space regime 
treat two key analytical categories-things and rights. By ana-
lyzing these objects in within space law regime, I hope to ex-
plore how a differentiated model of property illuminates ten-
sions over property allocation within the current international 
legal regime. Section II examines how a differentiated model of 
property law in space will help us to "re-think" two key areas in 
space: (1) the appropriateness of a de-contextualized treatment 
of property; and (2) the usefulness of an overarching "commons" 
principle in limiting potential broad claims of property in vari-
ous objects. While a number of radical reforms have been pro-
posed that involve wholesale privatization of space objects, ar-
guably, recognizing the "differentiated" aspects of property 
within space law would achieve a more nuanced perspective on 
reform that takes into account the overall historical goals of the 
international space regime. 
1. A DIFFERENTIATED MODEL OF PROPERTY IN SPACE 
After briefly analyzing the pre-occupation with territorial 
claims of ownership (or the lack thereof) in the international 
space regime, I first outline the basic framework of differenti-
ated model, which places more importance on a wider range of 
"property" categories than currently understood. I then exam-
ine two key categories-types of objects and types of rights-
which form the bases of a differentiated framework of property 
in space. Finally, I examine how these categories could work 
together to create a contextual understanding of rights that con-
form to pre-existing norms in property law. 
A. Territorial Property in Space 
The basic framework of international space consists of five 
treaties', which constitute binding law and over seventy associ-
1 The five treaties are: (1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celes-
tial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, T.IAS. 6347, 610 UN.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space 
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ated principles and declarations, which offer guidance as to the 
content of national legislation.' Analyses of property in space 
have usually focused on its most unique characteristic: its use of 
a communal regime to allocate access to the territory of space. 
Article II ofthe Outer Space Treaty provides that "[o]uter space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 
national appropriation by the claim of sovereignty, by means of 
use or occupation, or by any other means.'" This statement, 
commonly referred to as the "province of mankind" principle is 
based on the theory of res communis. The theory of res commu-
nis provides that since the character of some common resources 
is open to all by their very nature, exclusive appropriation is 
Treaty]; (2) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, U,N. GAOR, 22nd 
Sess" Supp. No. 16, at 5, U;N, Doc, Al6716 (1968), 19 U.S,T. 7570, 1968 U.s.T, LEXIS 
584 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]; (3) the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 UNTS 187 [hereinafter Liability 
Convention}; (4) the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, Jan" 14, 1975, art, II, U,N. GAOR, 29th Sess" Supp, No, 31, at 16, U.N. Doc. 
Al9631 (1975), 28 U.S.T. 695, 1975 U.s. T. LEXIS 552 [hereinafter Registration Conven-
tion]; and (5) the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N. Doc. 
Al34146 (1980), 18I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon TreatyJ. Widespread acceptance, of 
the Moon Treaty, however, is limited. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Comment, Moving The 
Heavens: Lunar Mining and the "Common Heritage of Mankind" in The Moon Treaty, 42 
UCLA L. REv. 575, 583-592(1994) (examining the limited international acceptance of 
the Moon Treaty). 
8 Over seventy sets of declaration and principles exist related to space-related 
activities. For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant principles and declarations 
are: (1) Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Uses of Outer Space, GA Res. 1962 (XIII), U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 
15, at 15, U.N. Doc. Al5515 (1964); (2) PrinCiples Governing the Use by States of Artifi-
cial Earth Satellites For International Direct Television Broadcasting, GA Res. 37/92, 
UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 98, UN Doc. Al37/51 (1982) [hereinafter 
Artificial Earth Satellite Principles]; (3) Principles Relating To Remote Sensing of the 
Earth From Outer Space, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 115, U.N. Doc. 
Al4lf53 (1986) (hereinafter Remote Sensing Principles]; (4) Principles to Use of Nuclear 
Power Sources in Outer Space, GA Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992); and (5) Declaration on 
International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and 
in Interest of All States, Taking In Particular Accounts the Needs of Developing Coun-
tries, Ga. Res. 5lJ122, , U.N. Doc. AlAC.105/5721Rev. 1 (1996), Other sources of space 
law include: (1) bilateral agreements between individual nations; (2) domestic space 
regulation, such as statutes and regulation; and (3) case law, interpreting the scope of 
international and domestic treaties. See Ty S. Twibell, Note, Space Law: Legal Re-
straints on Commercialization and Development of Outer Space, 65 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 
589,591-609 (1998). 
9 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 at art.11. 
366 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW [VOL. 32 
difficult, and therefore, use and access is open to all.1O The 
"province of maokind" of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is 
often contrasted to the broader "common heritage" doctrine of 
contained in Article 11 of the Moon Treaty. Article 11 provides 
that: (1) the moon and natural resources are the common heri-
tage of mankind; (2) the moon is not subject to national appro-
priation by use, occupation, or other means; (3) the surface or 
sub-surface of the moon cannot be become the property of any 
state, international intergovernmental or non-government or-
ganization, national organization, non-governmental entity or 
natural person; (3) equal non-discriminatory rights exist as to 
exploration and use of the moon; and (4) an international re-
gime must regulate the common territory." The "common heri-
tage" embodied by the Moon Treaty differs significantly from 
the "province of mankind" principle contained in Outer Space 
Treaty for two key reasons. First, unlike the province of man-
kind framework, the "common heritage" principle outlines a ba-
sic framework for extracting the resources. 12 Second, the "com-
mon heritage" principle dictates that any resource allocation 
must be conducted on an equitable basis by an international 
governing regime. '3 The "common heritage" principle, thus, goes 
10 Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creations, 66 SPG LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 91 (2003); Gerald Torres, Who Owns The Sky, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REv. 515, 528, 529-532 (2002) (examjnjng the development of the res communis princi-
ple). 
11 See The Moon Treaty, supra note 7 at art. 2 (1-6), 
12 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz and Jacqueline Etil Serrao, An Introduction to Space 
Law For Decision Makers, 30 J. OF SPACE L. 227, 229 (2004); see also Ellen S. 
Tenenbaum. A World Park in Antartica: The Common Heritage of Mankind, 10 VA. 
ENVTL L.J. 109, 113-115 (1990); Joanne Gahrynowicz, Crisis of the Commons: A Turning 
Point, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 31 
(1988); B. Mairorski, A Few Reflections on the Meaning and Interrelation of Province of 
Mankind and the Comnwn Heritage. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29m COLLOQUillM OF THE LAw 
OF OUTER SPACE 58·61 (1986). 
13 The strong principles of equitable treatment between developing and non-
developing nations, which are the core of the "common heritage" principles serves as a 
useful counter-example to recent trends in international intellectual property, which 
have typically neglected the issues of equity within the development context. Margaret 
Chon has argued that the international intellectual property should take into account 
into equitable considerations, by utilizing a principle of substantive equality. Under a 
principle of substantive equality, the "the decision maker should accord much less defer-
ence and exercise much more skepticism towards the proposed government action (in 
this case, the regulatory intervention by the state in the form of the grant of intellectual 
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much further than the neutral "province of mankind" principle 
by providing for a more defined account of resources that may 
result from exploring the territory of space, and moreover, pro-
viding for a governance model for determining how those re-
sources will be allocated. 
Use of each of these models has proven to be controversial. 
According to critics, the failure ofthe two principles lies primar-
ily in their perceived inability to secure private property rights 
in territory to various commercial and non-governmental actors. 
Legal uncertainty exists as to the scope of private territorial 
rights because of the ambiguities contained in the "no sover-
eignty" langnage of Article II. Article II could be interpreted to 
either allow a state to recognize extraterrestrial claims by as-
serting jurisdiction over its citizen's actions or to preclude all 
private claims in territory, whether the claim comes from na-
tion-states, natural persons, or juridical persons." As a result of 
this ambiguity, territorial claims of private property are not ac-
commodated and the subsequent failure to accommodate private 
claims in territory distorts incentives to develop a range of re-
sources from commercialized space travel to lunar mining. A 
number of solutions have been suggested to resolve this per-
ceived inability, among them: (1) amending Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty to eliminate the "no-sovereignty" clause15; 
(2) allowing governmental entities to issue land grants or other 
similar grants of interests in territorial space16; (3) creating a 
system to register and license territorial claims17; (4) adopting a 
free market approach undertaken limited by a defined regula-
property protection) in the context of the provision of a basic human development capa-
bility, such as basic education or health care," Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and 
the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2821, 2837 (2006). 
14 Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for International Space Law: Incorpo-
rating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles Into The 1967 Space Treaty For 
Colonization of Outer Space in The Twentieth-First Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REv. 299, 
333 (2004) (citing Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF 
LAw AND POLICY 27 (1989). 
15 Twibell, supra note 8, at 63S. 
16 Glenn H. Reynolds, Symposium, Environmental Rights and International Peace: 
Outer Space: Some Thoughts on Structures and Relations, 59 TENN. L. REv. 729, 733 
(1992). 
17 Kevin Cook, The Discovery of Lunar Water: An Opportunity to Develop a Workable 
Moon Treaty, 11 GEO.INT. ENVTL. L. REv. 647, 698 (1999). 
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tory umbrella18; and (5) adopting connnon-law possessory con-
cepts.19 
These proposals all share one common premise, namely, by 
extending the ability of non-governmental (whether they be 
public or private) actors to claim territory, claims as to other 
objects of property-land, chattels, and intangible property-
will be strengthened. This premise, however, conflates the ter-
ritorial approach embodied by the "province of mankind" and 
"connnon heritage" principles to all types of potential objects of 
property claims. According to this view, if territory is assumed 
to be opened, all other objects in that territory are presumed to 
be open. This premise is flawed. This premise presumes that 
the principles as to territory to extend to all other objects in 
which property can be claimed. Connnunal access to territory, 
however, does not preclude all other claims of private property 
in that territory. A more appropriate metaphor may be one 
suggested by Carol Rose, who has proposed that a proper way to 
conceive of this mixed regime is that of a street. In a street, 
"there is public access but private property too. People stop to 
chat with one another and with the street vendors. They laugh 
at the pet monkey's antics, drop into a shop and buy something, 
or have a seat and watch the other's pass by.,,20 Rose's account 
of a "street" landscape suggests that connnunal treatment of 
territory in space does not necessarily preclude that all other 
claims of ownership. Any analysis of the property law of space, 
then, does not end with the connnunal nature of territorial 
claims. Indeed, the treatment of property in international and 
national space law proves to be quite diverse if we look beyond 
territory as the only object of property claims in space. 
18 Lynn M. Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis 
Produced by the "Common Heritage of Mankind" Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1735, 1772-
1781 (2003). 
19 Gruner, supra note 14, at 345-354; Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 
Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 59, 98 (Fall 1999) (suggesting that space law must embrace the 
principle of private property). 
20 Carol M. Rose, Symposium, Introduction: Property and Language, or the Ghost of 
the Fifth Panel, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 18 (2006). 
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B. Chattels and Intangible Property in Space 
Both the core treaties and subsidiary principles offer ave-
nues for claiming property in chattel-type claims as well as in-
tangible property claims. The importance of Article VIII for this 
framework cannot be underestimated. This clause identifies a 
range of potential property objects and more importantly, estab-
lishes a framework for establishing jurisdiction over a wide va-
riety of objects. This jurisdictional element has allowed states 
to recognize a broader range of property rights, such as intangi-
ble property through domestic laws. In a differentiated model of 
property in space, Article VIII assumes an importance equal to 
that of Article II in terms of defining the scope of property 
rights. 21 
1. Chattels As Objects of Property in Space 
The Outer Space Treaty refers twice to objects that can be 
classified as personal chattel (since these items are movable in 
nature). Article VII refers to the "launching of objects" into 
outer space.22 Article VIII outlines a method of registering those 
objects.23 Article VIII identifies three types of potential objects: 
(1) an object launched into space; (2) objects landed or con-
structed on a celestial body; and (3) the component parts of each 
of these objects.'4 Later treaties have expanded upon these ini-
tial definitions. For instance, the Liability Convention and the 
Registration Convention define the term "space object" as "in-
21 A number of recent articles have emphasized the importance of Article VIII for 
establishing property rights in non-territorial objects. See, e.g., Henry R. Hertzfeld and 
Frans G. Von der Turk, Bringing Space Law Into the Commercial World Without Sover-
eignty. 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 81, 83 (2006); Kelley M. Zullo, Note, The Need To Clarify The 
Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2430 (2002). 
22 Article vn refers to the liability assessed to one state party if the launching of a 
registered space object causes damage to another state party or the natural or juridical 
actors of that state. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VII. An earlier version 
of this clause was included in Section 8 of Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. See Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States, supra note 8, § 8. 
211 Article VIII refers to the ability of a state to obtain jurisdiction over a space object 
placed upon the relevant state registry. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 
VIII. 
24 Id. 
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cluding component parts of a space object as well as its launch 
vehicle and parts."" A number of national laws have incorpo-
rated the same definition of "space object" into their domestic 
laws." A number of countries have adopted equivalent defini-
tions that protect a broader range of objects.27 
The Outer Space Treaty also contains references to items 
that can be classified as real chattel since these items can be 
potentially annexed or attached to the land of a celestial body. 
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty refers to "all stations, in-
stallations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and 
other celestial bodies."28 This type of chattel is less frequently 
referenced in subsequent treaties. Only Article 8(2)(b) of the 
Moon Treaty refers directly to this type of annexed property." 
The infrequency of reference to this type of property may be ex-
plained by the current difficulty of actually annexing items to 
space territory. 
2. Intangible Property As Objects of Property in Space 
Three types of potential intellectual property rights can po-
tentially apply to space activities: (1) patents that protect scien-
tific and technical information; (2) copyrights that protect satel-
lite broadcasts and remote sensing data; and (3) trademarks 
25 See Liability Convention, supra note 7, at art. led); Registration Convention, 
supra note 7, at art. 1(e). Article 8 (2)(a) of the Moon Treaty also refers to the abilities of 
space parties to land on and launch space objects from the moon. See Moon Treaty, 
supra note 7, at art. 8(2)(a). 
26 A number of nations have adopted the same language for their domestic statutes. 
See, e.g., The Outer Space Act, 1986, c.3S, §13 (England) (the term space object includes 
"component parts of a space object; its-launch vehicle, and the components of that."); 
605A Royal Decree 27811995, Establishing in the Kingdom of Spain of the Registry Fore-
seen In the Convention Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 2nd Novem-
ber 1974 (February 24, 1995) (Spain) (the term space object is "deemed to include both 
component parts thereof and the launch vehicle and parts thereof."). 
27 A number of equivalent definitions exist in other domestic statutes. See, e.g., The 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 42 U.S.C. § 2452 (2006) (the term "aero-
nautical and space vehicles" means "aircraft, missiles, satellites, and other space vehi-
cles, manned and unmarmed, together with related equipment, devices, components, 
and parts."); Space Affairs Act, Trade Industry No. 84 of 1993, s. 1 (South Africa) (the 
term launch vehicle means "any device manufactured or adapted to land a space:"craft"). 
2B See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at article XI. 
2ll See Moon Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 8{2)(b). 
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that may protect the naming of space projects and satellites.30 
Notably, however, these intangible objects of property are not 
directly referenced in the text of the Outer Space Treaty or the 
subsequent treaties. Of the relevant treaties, the Convention 
Relating To Distribution of Programme Carrying Signals 
Transmitted By Satellite ("the Brussels Convention") is the only 
standing multi-lateral agreement that specifically acknowledges 
the potential existence of intellectual property rights in a space-
related creation." Article 6 of the Brussels Convention states 
that "[t]his Convention shall in no way be interpreted to limit or 
prejudice the protection secured to authors, performers, produc-
ers of phonograms, or broadcasting organizations, under any 
domestic law or international agreement.,,32 While Article 6 rec-
ognizes the existence of potential intellectual property rights in 
direct satellite broadcasting, Article 6 is still negative in its ef-
fect since it relies on domestic law or international agreements 
to fill in the meaning of those rights. 
Any protection of intangible property, then, has been the 
result of two developments. First, Article VIII of the Outer 
Space Treaty has been interpreted to protect those intellectual 
property rights associated with a covered chattel. Under Article 
VIII, a property owner can claim a corresponding intangible 
property right under the relevant domestic regime due to the 
nation's ability to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the 
30 Leo B. Malagar & Marlo Apalisok Magdoza-Malagar, International Law of Outer 
Space and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 311, 350 
(1999); see also Ruwantissa Abeyrante, The Application of Intellectual Property Rights to 
Outer Space Activities, 29 (1), J. OF SPACE L. 1-20 (2003). 
31 Convention Relating To Distribution of Programme Carrying Signals Transmitted 
By Satellite, May 21,1974,1974 Lexls 269, TIAS 11078. 
32 Id. at art. 6. The approach of Article 6 is also reflected in the Article H of the 
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International 
Direct Television Broadcasting. See supra Artificial Earth Satellite Principles, note 8, at 
art. H ("[wlithout prejudice to the relevant provisions of international law, States should 
cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis for protection of copyright and 
neighbouring rights by means of appropriate agreements between the interested States 
or the competent legal entities acting under their jurisdiction. In such cooperation they 
should give special consideration to the interests of developing countries in the use of 
direct television broadcasting for the purpose of accelerating their national 
development"). Notably, Article H ofthls Principle does include a focus on the equitable 
redistribution of resources between developing and non-developing nations. 
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listed chattel. 33 The intellectual property right, then exists, as a 
subsidiary right that arises upon listing of an object on the reg-
ister. National statutes that grant intellectual property rights 
in items placed on a register typically contain an explicit juris-
dictional grant. For example, Section 105 of the Patent Act 
grants a patent in "an invention made, used or sold in outer 
space on a space object or component thereof under the jurisdic-
tion or control of the United States."" Section 105 reflects two 
common limits contained in these national statutes: (1) the pat-
ent has to be granted on a space object or component of that 
space object; and (2) the patent has to be under the jurisdiction 
and control of the United States. The major flaw, however, of 
this approach is that an intellectual property right will not be 
recognized if the chattel is not listed on the registry; this poten-
tially precludes a broader range of intellectual property rights 
from being claimed. 
A treaty or principle can also create a new property object 
and that property object can become subsequently assimilated 
into a nation's existing intellectual property regime. Take, for 
example, the passage of the Land Remote Sensing Commerciali-
zation Policy Act ("the Policy Act")" which referenced the defini-
tion of "primary data" contained in Principle I(b) of the Remote 
Sensing Principles in its definition of "unenhanced" data." By 
"' See Ex Parte McKay, 200 USPQ 324, 326 (1978) ( "It is clear from Article VIII of 
said Treaty that jurisdiction of the United States in personam. over any person is pre-
sent if the object launched into outer space is of United States registry. A patent grant 
under 35 U.S.C. 154 by the United States for a process to be carried out on the moon by 
personnel subject to its jurisdiction is thus not inimical and at variance with the indi-
cated section of the statute."); see also Twibell. supra note 8, at 617. 
"' 35 U.S.C. § 105 (2006). Notably, tbe language of Section 105 is broader than the 
same contained in Article VITI of the Outer Space Treaty since Section 105 subjects 
space objects listed on a register to the "jurisdiction" or "control" of the United States. 
See Dan EurIr. Application of United States Patent Law to Commercial Activity in Outer 
Space, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPo & HIGH TECH. L.J. 295, 347 (1991). 
36 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq. 
(2006). 
aa Compare Remote Sensing Principle, supra note 8, at Principle I(B) ("The term 
'primary data' means the raw data that are acquired by remote sensors borne by a space 
object and that are transmitted or delivered to the ground from space by telemetry in 
the form of electromagnetic signals, by photographic film, magnetic tape or any other 
means") with the Policy Act, supra note 35, at § 5602(13) ("The term 'unenhanced data' 
means land remote sensing signals or imagery products that are unprocessed or subject 
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incorporating the Principles into its national law, a new cate-
gory-data collected from remote sensing objects-then came 
under the ambit of the relevant domestic intellectual property 
regime. Such protection, however, depends on the scope ac-
corded to that right by the domestic intellectual property re-
gime. To continue with the above example, unenhanced data 
does not receive protection under copyright law in the United 
States because it lacks sufficient constitutional originality while 
under the copyright law of the European Union it most likely 
would receive a significant level of protection.37 
One central consequence results from this failure to develop 
an independent intellectual property regime in space law. From 
its beginning, the international space regime has emphasized 
the usefulness of a unified framework in addressing the signifi-
cant theoretical issues associated with the unique territory of 
space and its associated resources. Now, because the approach 
to intangible property has developed incrementally within par-
ticular national traditions, the overall space regime has turned 
to local approaches to allocate resources. This only deepens a 
commitment to a contextual approach to the treatment of prop-
erty within the overall space regime. One nation could poten-
tially grant stronger intellectual property rights to an item, 
while another could potentially grant less intellectual property 
rights to an item. Of course, these potential differences may 
have been diminished due to the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property, Including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinaf-
only to data preprocessing."). See also Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Defining Data Avail-
ability for Commercial Remote Sensing Systems: Under United States Federal Law, 23 
ANNALS OF Am AND SPACE L. 94, 98 (1998). 
31 Compare Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 
(1991) (''Facts, whether alone or a part of compilation, are not original, and therefore, 
may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an 
original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular 
selection or arrangement.") with Council Directive 96/9IEC, Art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 
("Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that 
there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the 
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to prevent extraction and/or re-
utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantita-
tively, of the contents of that database."). 
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ter to referred to as "TRIPS")" since TRIPS requires a minimum 
standard for intellectual property rights protection.39 The 
minimal standard however, may not completely ameliorate the 
possibility of different approaches. The rapidness of technologi-
cal change that takes place within the context of space may 
overtake the abilities of the international community to negoti-
ate the varying demands of property owners and public users. 
C. Rights in Property in Space 
A differentiated approach to property also necessitates a 
more nuanced understanding of rights in those property objects. 
The rights of property owners as an object of property fall into 
three categories: (1) the right to exclude others from using the 
object; (2) the right to use the object in a socially appropriate 
manner; and (3) the right to transfer the object. The strength of 
these rights, however, will ebb and flow, based on how much 
power, we accord to potentially competing public rights in that 
property. Laura Underkuffier has argued that the power af-
forded these rights reflects two underlying conceptions, the 
common conception of property rights and the operative concep-
tion of property rights. 40 The first, the common conception of 
property rights, affords "the individual tremendous protections 
against competing public interests ... [and, therefore these 
rights] are presumptively superior to the public that oppose 
38 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ie, 
1869 U.N.T.8. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
89 [d. at art. 3 (''Members shall accord the treatment provided for ill this Agreement 
to nationals of other Members."); art. 9 (outlining minimum standards of protection for 
copyright); art. 15 (outlining minimum standards of protection for trademark); & art. 16 
(outlining minimum standards of protection for patents). 
40 LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 132-
34 (2003); see also Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 
IX CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 161, 182-91 (1996); Laura S. Underkuffier-Freund, Response, 
Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1033, 1034-38 (1996). Underkuffier's 
theory has been applied in a variety of settings, see, e.g., Susan Ayres, The Rhetorics of 
Takings Cases: It's Mine v. Let's Share, 5 NEV. L.J. 615, 628-31 (Spring 2005) (discussing 
Underkufiler's two conceptions of property in relation to takings cases); Lior Zemer, The 
Conceptual Game in Copyright, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 409, 412-14 (Spring 
2006) (explaining Underkuffler's two conceptions framework and its application to copy-
right law). 
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them."4l Thus, the rights of a property owner seem to be inher-
ently opposed to the rights of the public and in a dispute be-
tween the two, individualized property rights will usually trump 
any expressed public goals. The second, the operative concep-
tion of property rights is a more flexible one. Under an opera-
tive conception of power, "collective powers to control are seen 
as an inherent part of the initial configuration of ownership 
privileges.,,4' An operative conception then accords less power to 
any individual property right, by incorporating collective rights 
into the initial allocation of property rights.43 Underkuffier's 
theory recognizes that the outcome of many debates in property 
reflects the underlying theoretical conception selected by the 
relevant decision-maker. 
Underkuffler's account of variable property rights is consis-
tent with a differentiated model of property in space law as the 
particular strength of individual rights to exclude, use, and 
transfer will vary depending on the relevant property object. 
For instance, individual rights in territory are accorded little or 
no value and must yield to a number of important public inter-
ests. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty does not simply require 
access to territorial space but also states that access and use 
must take place on a non-discriminatory and equal basis.« 
These collective "use" rights to territory can be seen to act con-
sistently with an operative conception of property in which 
rights are seen as inherently collective from the onset.45 By con-
trast, the rights to use, transfer, and exclude in intangible prop-
erty objects, are stronger than those in territory. For instance, 
a potential copyright owner has a right to prevent others from 
41 See UNDERKUFFLER. THE IDEA OF PROPERTY, surpra note 40, at 132. 
42 Id. at 41. 
~ ld. at 62. 
44 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. I. 
45 The corresponding right to exclude is diminished in light of these strong collective 
"use" rights. As J.E. Penner notes "rights to purely exclude or purely to use interact 
naturally, as it were, in the sense that use almost always involves some exclusion of 
others ... So long as we conceive of a right to use in a social situation, in the real world, 
that is, the implications of that kind of right will raise issues about the rightfulness of 
excluding others, because the vast majority of the uses that a person will make of a 
thing are impossible if everyone tries to use the thing at the same time. See PENNER, 
supra note 1, at 68M 69. 
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using and distributing enhanced data under the current inter-
national space regime.46 Arguably, it could be said that rights 
as to an intangible property right are those typically associated 
with a common conception of property. Of course, a number of 
factors may complicate this claim such as the status of the in-
tangible property within national law or the intrinsic character-
istics of the intangible right itself.47 
The sharp contrast, however, between the treatment of ter-
ritory, on the one hand, and intangible property, on the other, 
may over-simplify how all categories of property objects are 
treated in space law. Often, a more nuanced account of these 
rights will suffice. For example, the treatment of chattel placed 
on land in Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty implies an abil-
ity for individuals to own the relevant chattel (thus, a corre-
sponding right to a transfer ownership of that right), but then 
subjects the chattel to significant public use and access rights." 
Moreover, the rights of use and access are not unbounded. Arti-
cle XII imposes a number of restrictions on this access, includ-
ing: (1) reciprocal access to the relevant chattel; (2) reasonable 
notice of the projected visit; and (3) reasonable safety pre-
cautions." This nuanced account of property rights demon-
strates the importance of differentiating the type of property at 
issue from the beginning since the subsequent assessment of 
relevant property rights will depend very much on the type of 
property at issue. 
II. RE-THINKING PROPERTY: ADOPTING A DIFFERENTIATED 
MODEL INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SPACE LAw 
Adopting a differentiated framework has its limits. Space, 
unlike a garden, or a street is a territory that is uniquely inac-
46 J. Richard West, Comment, Copyright Protection For Data Obtained by Remote 
Sensing: How The Data Enhancement Industry Will Ensure Access For Developing Coun-
tries, 11 NW. J. INT'L & Bus. 403, 416-20 (1990) (reviewing the copyright protection that 
attaches to enhanced data under national laws). 
47 For example, the monopoly rights associated with a patent may accord stronger 
individual rights to an owner than the lesser use rights associated with a protected 
copyright. 
48 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7. at art. XII. 
49 [d. 
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cessible to human exploitation. Moreover, space law, may resist 
differentiation to the extent that it relies on a treaty framework 
for its primary source of law. A differentiation process benefits 
from the fact that common law can adopt a contextual approach 
to issues as they arise; a treaty framework does not always pro-
vide the same flexibility. Despite these concerns, however, a 
differentiated model of property in space will, perhaps, provide 
a useful way to analyze tensions within the current space re-
gime that have become apparent upon the increase commer-
cialization of space resources. In this Section, I will address two 
key consequences of adopting a differentiated framework. First, 
I will examine the other types of treaties and frameworks that 
have adopted a differentiated model in their treatment of prop-
erty. Second, I will analyze the usefulness of a differentiated 
framework to support a re-conceptualized "communal" principle 
in the space regime. 
A. Re-Thinking Context 
Two treaty regimes usually serve as the primary models as 
to the treatment of property in space: (1) the treaty regime that 
regulates the use of Antarctica; and (2) the treaty regime that 
regulates use of the deep seabed mining." Neither of these 
treaty regimes, however, differentiates between the objects of 
property claims. For example, the Article VII of the Antarctica 
Treaty refers to a category of chattel outlining a right to inspect 
"all stations, installations, and equipment" located on Antarc-
tica.'! The term "inspect", however, implies a lesser type of li-
cense right rather than a broader right to use. Despite these 
limits, notably, both treaty regimes have adopted approaches 
which allow governing authorities to exercise jurisdictional con-
trol over property claims associated with nationally approved 
50 See, e.g., Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 
3 J.INT'L L. & PRAC. 359, 362 (1994) (discussing the importance of the Antarctica Treaty 
regime for the development of the Outer Space Treaty); Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 593-
603 (discussing the deep seabed mining regime). 
" The Antarctic Treaty, arts. VIl(l) & (3), Dec. 1. 1959, 12 U.S.T. 764,402 U.N.T.S. 
71. 
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non-governmental actors." However, an articulated framework 
that distinguishes between the types of potential objects re-
mains notably silent. 
On the other hand, TRIPS, the multi-lateral treaty frame-
work for governing intellectual property, may offer a more rele-
vant model for a differentiated framework in property in space. 
The framework of TRIPs recognizes a range of objects subject to 
property claims, including copyright and related rights, trade-
marks, geographical indications, industrial designs and trade 
secrets.53 While protecting such a wide of range of objects has 
created intense criticism", the usefulness of the TRIPS' models 
lies in the way the treaty differentiates between the different 
limits placed on right-holders. TRIPS offers two distinctly dif-
ferent types of limits on the right-holders. First, Article 8 pro-
vides two distinct principles that members may take into an 
account when drafting or formulating relevant intellectual 
property principles. Article 8(1) allows members to "adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition and 
to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance."" 
Article 8(2) allows members to take appropriate measures 
"needed to prevent the abuse of an intellectual property rights 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technol-
ogy."" Other articles are to be interpreted in lights of these 
general principles; therefore, these principles can be said to 
52 [d. at art. VTII. 
oS TRIPS, supra note 38, at art. 9(1) (protecting copyrights recognized under Berne 
Convention); art. 10 (protecting copyrights in computer programs); art. 14 (granting 
performers public performance rights); art. 15 (protectible subject in trademarks); art. 
22 (protecting geographical indications which identify a good as a originating in the 
territory, region or locality of a member nation); art. 25 (protecting new or original in-
dustrial designs); & art. 27 (protecting patentable subject mater in all fields, providing 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and capable of industrial application). 
54 See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and 
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 614 (1996) (TRIPS imposes a Western notion of 
copyright on developing nations); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS' Rebound: An Historical 
Analysis of How the TRIPS Agreement Can Richocet Against the United States, 25 NW. 
J. INT'L & Bus. 99, 102-03 (2004) (TRIPS undermines the sovereign power of the United 
States to determine domestic policy and further undermines the specific public policy 
goals of domestic intellectual property policy). 
66 TRIPS, supra note 38, at art. 8(1). 
ss Id. at art. 8(2). 
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temper these scope of the enumerated rights. Second, TRIPS 
contains a number of limitations and exceptions that can be ap-
plied to a discrete set of objects, namely, copyrights, trade-
marks, and patents. Article 13, Article 17, and Article 30, all, in 
varying degrees, allow members to enact laws that allow for 
"limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights.,;;7 These three Ar-
ticles, in particular, are examples of a differentiated notion of 
property. These Articles only apply to those rights which are 
afforded stronger set of enumerated rights. So, for instance, 
these Articles are not applicable to other types of protected 
rights under TRIPS such as industrial designs or trade secrets. 
Moreover, the scope of the Articles differs. Article 13 only pro-
tects those limitations or exceptions that do not "conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work" and do not "unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder" while Arti-
cle 30 permits a member nation considering the above interests, 
to take into "account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties."" The variable strength of these limits emphasizes the 
contextual analyses under TRIPS that result from the differen-
tiated treatment of objects and rights in those objects. 
TRIPS, then, is useful in that it suggests potential strate-
gies that support contextual interpretations of property within a 
treaty regime. General principles can apply to a broad range of 
categories covered by the treaties; more specific limitations or 
exceptions can be applied to specific categories. AB to the for-
mer, the international space regime, actually offers a useful 
counter-example to TRIPS. General principles, such as the 
"peaceful purposes" principle articulated in the introduction of 
the Outer Space Treaty have been commonly viewed as an inte-
gral to interpreting the specific provisions of the relevant trea-
ties; by comparison, this claim as to Article 8 of the TRIPS is 
still relatively controversial.59 AB to the latter, as discussed in-
fra, the international space regime has not developed a sophisti-
cated framework. In that, TRIPs can serve as a useful example 
57 Id. at art. 13 (limitations and exceptions on copyrights); art. 17 (limitations and 
exceptions on trademarks); & art. 30 (limitations and exceptions on patents). 
58 Compare id. at arts. 13 & 30. 
69 See generally Chon, supra note 13. 
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given its careful account of the appropriate balance between 
public and private interests. 
B. Re-Thinking Commons 
A differentiated model of property in space may also sup-
port a more sophisticated view of the underlying communal 
principles central to the current international space regime. 
Two significant interpretative distortions arise from a refusal to 
acknowledge that the international space regime contemplates 
variable rights in diverse property objects. Initially, certain ar-
eas of international space law may be developing in ways incon-
sistent with the overall communal purposes of the international 
space regime due to the failure to openly acknowledge the dif-
ferentiated aspects ofthe space regime. Over-reliance on differ-
ent domestic regimes to articulate the boundaries of these prop-
erty rights may create inconsistent, over protective approaches 
to different objects. 
I return to the useful example of Section 105(a) of the Pat-
ent Act. Section 105 allows a patent to be granted in any inven-
tion made, used, or sold in outer space on a space object or a 
component of a space object." The inclusion of the terms "made, 
used, or sold" has typically been interpreted to read Section 105 
together with Section 271(a) which defmes the acts of infringe-
ment under the Patent Act.61 Recently, Federal Circuit consid" 
erably expanded the extra-territorial scope of Section 271(a) in 
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.," In NTP, the Federal 
Circuit found that if the beneficial use of the claimed invention 
is in the United States, a patent could be infringed even if a key 
00 35 U.S.C. §105(a). 
61 Burk, supra note 34 at 342·43. 
"' NTP. Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Po· 
tentially expansive extra·territorial interpretations have also been applied within the 
context of 35 U.S.C.§ 271(f). See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.2d 1366, cert. 
granted, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 467 (U.S. Oct 27, 2006)(a master 
version of software code transmitted electronically and replicated abroad constitutes a 
component supplied from the United States, and therefore, violates 35 U.S.C. §271(f)); 
Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.23d 1325 (2005)(master version of 
software code made in the United States, shipped on a golden master disk to be repli-
cated abroad constitutes a component supplied from the United States, and therefore, 
violates 35 U.S.C .. § 271(1)(f). 
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component or step of the allegedly infringing product is located 
or performed abroad." Under a generous reading of NTP, a pat~ 
ent claimant in a space object (such as a satellite) could assert 
that the laws of the United States would apply since the benefi-
cial use of the product was in the United States even if a key 
component of the invention was located in space." Such claims, 
by their very nature, may be potentially disruptive to the over-
all goals of the space law regime. For instance, significant pro-
prietary claims on satellite technology itself could undermine 
the principle of non-discriminatory access of data contained in 
Article XII of the Remote Sensing Principles." Refusing to ad-
dress differentiated aspects of property in space leaves ques-
tions such as these unexamined and is detrimental to the over-
all functioning of the international space regime. 
(l.~ Id. (The use of a claimed invention is "the place in which the system as a whole is 
put into service, i.e., the place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use 
of the system obtained.") 
Go! The United States is not the only nation that appears to be broadening its extra-
territoriality concepts, see also Menashe Business Mercantile Limited v. William Hill 
Organization, Ltd., RPC 31, EWCA Civ 1702 CA (2002), at Hll-12: 
[d. 
The claimed invention required there to be a host computer. In the present age 
it did not matter where the host computer was situated. It could be in the 
United Kingdom or on a satellite or elsewhere. Its location was not important 
to the user of the invention nor to the claimed gaming system. In that respect, 
there was a real difference between the claimed gaming system and an ordi-
nary machine. It was wrong to apply the old ideas of location to inventions of 
the type under consideration in the present case. A person who was in the 
United Kingdom who obtained in the United Kingdom a CD and then used his 
tenninal to address a host computer was not bothered where the host com-
puter was located. It was of no relevance to him, the user nor the patentee as 
to whether or not it was situated in the United Kingdom. Where the-host 
computer was situated abroad and the tenninal computer was in the United 
Kingdom, it was pertinent to ask who used the claimed gaming system. The 
answer was that it was the punter who used it. There was no doubt that he 
used his terminal computer in the United Kingdom and it was not a misuse of 
language to say that he used the host computer in the United Kingdom. It 
was the input to and output of the host computer that was important to the 
user and in a real sense he used the host computer in the United Kingdom 
even though it was situated and operated abroad. Thus, the supply of the CD 
in the United Kingdom to the United Kingdom punter was intended to put the 
invention into effect in the United Kingdom. 
65 See Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 8, at Principle XII. 
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Failure to appreciate the differentiated aspects of property 
in space also leads decision-makers to insufficiently address 
whether the co=unal approach articulated by Article II would 
have any subsequent interpretative force for Article VIII. While 
this Article suggests that Articles II and VIII outline variable 
property rights in different objects, it remains unclear whether 
Article II should serve as a "fIrst among equals", performing as 
a basic normative principle that marks and constrains maximal 
private property assertions in non-territorial property objects. 
Again, reference to TRIPS provides a useful perspective.Mar-
garet Chon argues that international intellectual property re-
gime should adopt a substantive equality principle, based in 
part, on the general principles articulated by Article 8 of 
TRIPS." Under such an approach, a decision-maker will engage 
a strict scrutiny analysis when an intellectual property right 
conflicts with a basic development right such as a right to 
health or education." Arguably, Article II could be used to play 
a similar role within the international and national space law 
regime in two signifIcant ways." First, using Article II, a deci-
sion-maker might determine that in a conflict between an 
owner's asserted intellectual property right and wider public 
use of the protected object, the goals and principles of Article II 
protects the expansive use rather than the limited property 
claim. Second, a decision-maker could argue that a domestic 
legislative decision to expand an individual intellectual property 
right broadly could amount to appropriative act under Article II. 
However, use of Article II as a substantive norm would not 
eliminate the existence of property rights in non-territorial 
property rights. Rather, use of Article II could serve as a limit-
ing principle that could constrain over-enthusiastic grants of an 
intellectual property right at the nationallT regional leveL 
6S Chon, supra note 13, at 2885-86. 
&7 Id. 
68 The use of overall principles to govern interpretations of space law appears to be 
a common practice. For instance, Ram Jakhu has argued that any appropriation of 
space territory under Article II may also be governed by the general purposes outlined 
by Article I, Paragraph 2 of the OST. See Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the 
Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J. OF SPACE L. 45 (2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
Hopefully, this Essay is the beginning of a fruitful dialogue 
on claims of property within international and national space. I 
have attempted to sketch out the basic contours of a differenti-
ated model in property in international and national space law. 
A nuanced framework is necessary in the international and na-
tional space law for two key reasons. First, a more nuanced 
framework would be helpful to respond to the major changes in 
technology that characterizes space law. Second, a more nu-
anced framework recognizes the flexibility of the treaty regime 
itself to accommodate and respond to stronger claims of individ-
ual property. In this, space law may share other characteristics 
of the gardens I mentioned at the beginning of this Essay; the 
ability to change and grow in response to the needs of its users. 
